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Abstract—The present article details the development steps
and experimental results obtained during the development
of smart actuators used for mini Unmanned Aerial Vehicles.
Unlike the commercial off-the-shelf hobby components, these
units are able to measure position, angular rate and current,
furthermore with their controlling microprocessors they are
capable of establishing two way communication via CAN and
FlexRay protocol. They are suitable for safety critical appli-
cations, and self diagnostics features are also hosted onboard
the actuators to be part of a redundant, distributed control
network. The development challenges and experimental results
in an example hardware-in-the-loop simulator of an Unmanned
Aerial System are discussed in the paper.
I. INTRODUCTION
The emerging role of Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS) for
both military and civil operations depends on the ability to
gain unrestricted access to national airspace ([14], [4]). One
of the key issues that must be resolved to open up the skies
for UAS is to be able to coexist safely and effectively with
current manned operations in the national and international
airspace. This includes the ability to follow pilot commands
with high fidelity even in the case of component faults.
Since current UAVs, with the exception of Predator, Global
Hawk and a few other high cost systems, use single string
avionics, there is no way of mitigating flight control system
component faults during flight ([3]). It is our aim to develop
a redundant low-cost avionics system for UAVs ([10], [12]),
where hardware redundancy is combined with analytical
redundancy to reduce the overall weight and cost, but take
advantage of increased computational performance onboard
the aircraft.
The avionics system is based on the philosophy, that in
most situations a carefully selected set of built-in-tests and
proper handing over protocols between parallel channels can
provide the necessary reliability figures ([16]). In case two
flight control computers are used and one fails the other will
be able to clearly identify the event of a fault in almost
all situations if we assume the failed node is transmitting
random messages not intentionally trying to attack the rest
of the system. The system architecture developed in SZTAKI
(Computer and Automation Research Institute of the Hungar-
ian Academy of Sciences) can be seen in Fig. 6. It consists
of two independent flight control computers, two INS/GPS
sensor units, the three major motion axes are controlled
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by pairs of independent flight control surfaces, the aircraft
has two engines with their own dedicated batteries, two
independent electrical power sources are fed to each avionics
component and the avionics components are interconnected
with a safety critical FlexRay communication bus ([11]).
The overall architecture, in its simplest form consists of 12
smart units, each having its own computational capability,
which allows to transmit two directional messages between
Flight Control Computers (FCC) and actuators ([10]). In
conventional small size UAV applications the FCC only
sends analog commands to the actuators and might receive
an analog feedback from a position sensor about the current
status of the unit. In our approach the FCC sends commands
over a digital channel to the actuators, where the smart unit
takes care of the internal control tasks of servo control and
Pulse Width Modulation (PWM) control of the DC motor
inside the actuator. Besides the local control tasks the unit is
also capable of providing fault detection capabilities ([15]),
since position, back electromotive force1 and drawn current
are all measured and using the mathematical model of the
actuator analytic parity relations can be used to identify
anomalous behavior.
FlexRay communication protocol is selected to provide
interconnection between the nodes due to its low cost and
the availability of development tools ([12]). A consortium
including BMW, DaimlerChrysler, Motorola, and Philips, has
developed FlexRay for powertrain and chassis control in cars.
It differs from conventional buses like CAN or LIN, since
its operation is divided between time-triggered and event-
triggered activities. Published descriptions of the FlexRay
protocols and implementation are described in ([11]). In
both cases, duplication of the interconnect is optional. Each
FlexRay interface (it is called a communication controller)
drives the lines to its interconnects through separate bus
guardians located with the interface. (This means that with
two buses, each node has three clocks: one for the controller
and one for each of the two guardians; this differs from
the bus configuration of TTA, an alternative time-triggered
protocol ([9]), where there is one clock for the controller
and both guardians share a second clock.) Like the bus
configuration of TTA, the guardians of FlexRay are not fully
independent of their controllers.
II. DESIGN CONSIDERATIONS
It is practical to develop custom servos with the same
form factor as the standard ones available because the
1Back EMF is the voltage induced by the motor, when no current is
drawn (no voltage is applied), from which RPM can also be measured at
high rotation rate.
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Fig. 1. Futaba S3305 COTS RC servo and the custom servo with measurement and power electronics.
gearbox, housing and DC motor can be re-used. On the other
hand the onboard electronics of a COTS servo is a black
box for the user, hence it cannot be modified for research
purposes. Moreover, they do not satisfy the requirements
of a modern, reliable UAV, as they are built from a few
standard components with minimum ‘intelligence’ in their
control logics:
• The control is done with a dedicated printed circuit
board, in this form there is no way of modifying its
behaviour
• Servo shaft angle (motor shaft after the reduction gears)
is measured with a potentiometer which physically
limits displacement and has a high level of noise
• Induced voltage of the motor is not measured
• Voltage regulation is done via a MOSFET bridge
• The reference signal is implemented with a 0 − 5 V
level PWM input, this corresponds to a 50 Hz frequency
square wave signal with different pulse widths. Maxi-
mum displacement is commanded with 1 ms long high
and 19 ms long low signal value, while negative sign
maximum displacement is achieved with 2 ms long high
signal level.
• The difference between maximum and minimum dis-
placement is less than 270 degrees, limited by the
mechanical construction of the potentiometer
• Communication with the environment is one-way, via
the PWM signal.
Due to the aforementioned limitations, COTS servos are
not applicable for modern UAVs. The custom made servo
has to satisfy the following performance requirements:
• Independent, self-contained operation with multiple cas-
cade control-loops, reference tracking with sufficient
bandwidth and zero steady state error
• The control-loop parameters should be tunable, to
achieve different desired responses
• To satisfy the model based control and fault detection
requirements, the model parameters should be measured
or identified
• All the measurable quantities should be available for
diagnostic purposes, to provide the highest number of
analytically redundant data
• Self-testing and self-diagnostics should be implemented
• High-level, two-way communication via the FlexRay (or
at least CAN) bus should be used for real-time, fault
tolerant performance
• The lifespan of the servo due to customization should
not be compromised
The first task is to select a suitable servo type for modifi-
cation. The three main requirements are precision, maximum
torque and lifespan. Since only the housing, gears and the
motor is used in the modified servo, these requirements
pointed towards a unit with metal gears, small backlash and
with sufficient space in the housing. The motor should be
coreless, since it is free from the reluctance type torque
disturbances, which makes the characteristics of the motor
magnetic field nonlinear around small torques, undesirable
for control purposes. We used a COTS Futaba S3305 RC
servo [7] as a baseline, which is modified during the de-
velopment of the custom actuator unit as shown in Fig. 1.
This has a non-coreless motor, but the gears are metal with
minimal backlash. In a later stage of development we will
consider to replace it by a coreless one.
In the second stage of the development, the electron-
ics modules of the unit are developed. According to the
specification, the servo should be able to communicate via
the FlexRay [11] bus. Since this communication protocol
is not widespread in the industry, due to its maturity, only
a limited set of microcontrollers have communication con-
trollers built into them supporting the FlexRay protocol. Our
choice was to use the Freescale S12XF512 microcontroller,
which has a development environment and available not only
for automotive customers. This unit is a relatively large
integrated circuit, with 112 legs, which is larger than the
size of the servo housing, hence the complete electronics
is done in two separate components. The board housing
the sensors, power electronics and the control electronics is
placed inside the servo unit, while the board containing the
S12XF microcontroller is outside the box, connected via a
dedicated cable, as shown in Fig. 3. The module containing
the microcontroller is designed to be able to control not
only the servos but the large BLDC electrical engines of
the aircraft via their dedicated power electronics. The units
also have a CAN bus communication link [8] which can
be used for the same purpose as FlexRay if safety critical
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Fig. 2. Architecture of the modified PI controller with feedforward of the command signal.
Fig. 3. Block scheme of the servo mechanism.
communication is not necessary. The electronics inside the
servo contains the following components:
• Sensor for the angle measurement of the servo shaft
• Circuit, including signal conditioning and amplification,
of the induced voltage measurement in the motor
• Circuit, including signal conditioning and amplification,
of the current measurement inside the motor
• The MOSFET bridge, controlling the motor voltages,
with its driving circuit
The magnetic rotary encoder, which measures shaft po-
sition is the Austria Micro Systems AS5045 unit which is
a system on a chip solution for Hall-element sensing. The
analog amplification and digital signal processing is done on
the unit, measurement are sent via an SPI communication
bus. It allows contactless angle measurement with 12 bit
resolution leading to 0.0875◦ maximum precision.
The digital input commands are the direction of the
rotation and the voltage on the motor and the position of the
shaft, the motor current and the ack EMF signals are sent
back to the microcontroller board. The supply voltage for
the motor and for the electronics are also sent via this cable.
The control, fault diagnostics and communication algorithms
are implemented on the microcontroller, which has access
to all internal and the necessary external signals. The circuit
board is capable to connect to a redundant electrical network,
via a power switch, which is selecting always the healthier
electrical bus with seamless transition.
III. IMPLEMENTATION
A. CONTROL
One of the main goals of the custom servo development
is precise position control. To close the position loop in
the controller an additional inner angular rate loop based
on back EMF measurement is necessary. It is interesting to
note, that this signal can be measured only when there is
no voltage applied to the motor (at zero PWM level), after
the transients. A dedicated logic is determining the required
PWM signal and based on the rotation speed the sequence
of polarities applied to the motor to maintain the desired
rotation direction, since only rate but not the direction is
determined by the PWM signal.
The logic behind the control is the following: position
control is done with 250 Hz, with position measurement of
250 Hz. The frequency of the PWM signal is 1 kHz, back
EMF is measured with this frequency and speed control is
also done with 1 kHz. It is also important to note, that back
EMF is always measured in the middle of the low PWM
level, to reduce the transient effects. Obviously the more
the duty cycle is, the more the noise rate of the back EMF
measurement has, hence the frequency of the PWM and the
duty cycle is limited.
The control is done via two cascade loops, where the inner
loop is realized as a P controller and the outer loop as a
modified PI controller with feedforward of the command
signal [6]. The inner loop is responsible for angular rate
while the outer loop for angle reference tracking as shown
in Fig. 2 (saturation of angular rate and PWM increments
are included in the controller blocks). As a first step, the
model of the actuator is identified, using subspace based
identification methods. PWM steps are used as input signals,
while back EMF, shaft angle and current measurements are
used as outputs. The identified model has one dominant and
one minor modes, hence a simple first order model is selected
for control design purposes:
Gnom =
2.836
s+ 7.586
,
where the input of the model is PWM increment, the maxi-
mum value of which is 1675 (maximum duty cycle is 67%),
while the output is angular rate of the output shaft in ◦/sec.
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Fig. 4. Block diagram of the Fault Detection Filter
The identification is done around 0 ◦/sec angular rate, but it
is important to note that a maximum angular rate of 420 ◦/sec
is achievable with the design and at higher angular rates the
system becomes strongly nonlinear. The detailed description
of the control loops and their implementation can be found
in [13]. As the inner P controller has steady state error, the
saturation limit is 500 ◦/sec.
B. SENSOR COMPENSATION
Considering the assembly of the magnetic rotary encoder,
due to the misalignment of the shafts, a periodic offset
error is introduced in angle measurement. To determine the
compensation of this cyclic error, first the measured angle
have to be unwrapped and detrended. In this signal there
is a periodical component, and its period equals to one
turn of the shaft [13]. To remove this offset a polynomial
is fitted and subtracted from the original signal. After a
sufficient number of measurements, within the confidence
interval of the periodic errors, the most likely offset values
- for a complete turn - are obtained by averaging. Finally
quantization is needed, to get sensor increment dimension
for software implementation. After compensation, the con-
trol characteristics are only slightly affected, however the
absolute position measurement is improved from 2◦ RMS
value down to a significantly lower 0.15◦.
C. FAULT DIAGNOSTICS
Building a redundant avionics architecture requires an
algorithm that identifies the faults of the redundant compo-
nents. To make the units fully self-contained, this algorithm
is also implemented in the microcontroller running the con-
trol algorithms. Besides simple range and freeze checks of
the signals which can detect obvious fault scenarios (e.g.
open-circuit failure of a MOSFET) model-based detection
is also implemented to recognize faults that affect the per-
formance in a less abrupt way. One such fault is the partial
jamming of a control surface which results in a great increase
in motor load. We use a Fault Detection Filter (FDF) as a
simple model-based approach to detect this fault mode.
An FDF is based on a full-order state observer, from which
the output of the system is reconstructed. This estimated
output is subtracted from the measured output and then
filtered by a low-pass or band-pass filter, forming the residual
signal [5], [2]. If this signal exceeds a predefined threshold
an error is signalled.
The inputs of the observer are the PWM signal and the
angular rate of the output shaft. The outputs are the estimated
angular rate and current, but only the latter is used for
the residual generation, bacause the jamming fault mode is
associated with increased current consumption.
The model identified in Section III-A can be written into
state-space form:
x˙ = Ax+Bu
y = Cx+Du
where
A =
[ −2.567 10.863
−309.344 −405.718
]
, B =
[
0
85.628
]
,
C =
[
1 0
]
, D = 0
and u is the input voltage in PWM increments, y is the
output angular rate in ◦/sec and the first component of the
state vector is the angular rate and the second component
is the current. It is worth to note that this model is valid
around the trim point of 800 PWM increments and with a
9 V supply voltage. As the maximum PWM duty cycle is
67 % the voltage supply is techniquely 6V.
The system is observable as the observability matrix has
rank 2. The observer has the form:
˙ˆx = Axˆ+Bu+ L(y − Cxˆ−Du)
yˆ = Cxˆ+Du
where with the appropriate choice of the observer matrix L
the poles of the observer dynamics (A−LC) can be allocated
arbitrarily, thus setting the convergence rate of the observer.
The poles are chosen to be [−200,−200.1] for sufficient
bandwidth, with pole multiplicity of 1 to have a numerically
better conditioned result.
To reduce the effect of measurement noise, the angular rate
is filtered with a second order low-pass Butterworth filter.
Experimental results show, that 5 Hz cutoff frequency is
efficient for eliminating the noise, without considerable phase
delay. Because of the H-bridge circuit in the power electron-
ics current always flows through the current-sensing resistor
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in one direction, regardless of the direction of rotation, so
the sign of the measured current must be determined from
the sign of the PWM signal. The observer is implemented
with 250 Hz sampling frequency on the microcontroller.
The state space representation is transformed into a trans-
fer function and the residual signal is built from the estimated
current. To obtain the residual signal the estimated current is
subtracted from the measured current and then fed through a
low-pass filter with a cutoff frequency of 0.159 Hz to reduce
the effect of noise and high-frequency model uncertainties,
while maintaining robustness but shortening detection time
as much as possible. (Fig. 4).
IV. TEST RESULTS
A. CONTROL
The behaviour of the servo is compared with the COTS
servo unit (Futaba S3305) as shown in Fig. 5. The response
for a step command of 32◦ (130 % of the maximum actuator
command) is compared. Although the rising time of the
custom servo is slightly larger than the COTS’s but it has
no overshoot. Considering an aerial vehicle, it is an absolute
necessity. Neither of them has steady state error, however
the COTS can be easily rotated by hand, while the cus-
tom servo exerts much higher counterforce, with negligible
transient in the position owing to the anti-windup. Tests are
made in a hardware-in-the-loop (HIL) test environment of
a UAV system, which is used to validate the navigation
and control algorithms and the hardware components of
the system before flight tests. The environment is used to
test the fault tolerant avionics architecture being developed
at SZTAKI [1]. The current set-up contains a PC running
the dynamic model of the UAV and its environment, two
Flight Control Computers (FCCs), three servo actuators and
the network interconnecting them [10], [12], [16] shown in
Fig. 6. Simulated sensor data is sent to FCCs via a serial
link, where navigation and control algorithms are executed
and the control commands are sent to the Actuator Control
Computers via the FlexRay network. Actual position of the
actuators, along with other measurements useful for health
monitoring, are sent back to drive the aircraft dynamics.
Including the physical actuator dynamics into the system
increases the fidelity of the simulation and its effects can be
Fig. 5. Comparison of Futaba S3305 and custom servo.
Fig. 6. Hardware-in-the-loop setup for UAV development.
taken into account in the design of the overall flight control
algorithms, moreover simulated failures can be injected to
test the safety critical aspects of the system.
Actuator deflections in an autonomous waypoint naviga-
tion flight are shown in Fig. 7. It can be seen that the
reference signal is tracked well and the steady state error
is smaller than 0.4◦, which is acceptable for flight control
purposes.
B. FAULT DIAGNOSTICS
The estimated and measured current in open-loop can
be seen on Fig. 8, the motor is controlled around the
trim point where the model is identified. In the fault-free
case the estimated current is tracking the measured value
within approximately 44 mA and when a fault is induced
(manual locking of the output shaft) there is a remarkable
difference between the signals. Several measurements on
different servo units prove the robustness of the observer.
Though the observer is designed for the particular servo unit
which model is identified, there is no significant difference
in tracking errors of other units. The absolute value of the
residual is below 11 mA in the fault free case but when a
jamming fault is induced it reaches the value of 370 mA in
2.18 s.
To validate the closed loop operation of the filter and
to determine the threshold for the jamming fault mode
extensive tests are made in the HIL test environment. During
a simulation of 21 minutes control demands of the servos are
collected and then used as realistic control inputs during the
testing and threshold setting of the FDF. The maximum of
the absolute value of the residual signal is 77 mA during the
whole test in the fault-free case and reached 705 mA when
a fault occurred, so a threshold of 100 mA is chosen. It can
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Fig. 7. Actuator deflections in a hardware-in-the-loop simulation.
Fig. 8. Operation of the FDF in open loop. The servo is rotating clockwise
with 130-145 ◦/sec. A fault is occuring at 18.74 s
be seen on Fig. 9 that when the fault occurred the residual
exceeded the threshold in 0.24 s and dropped below it 2.18 s
after the end of the fault. The fault detection algorithm built
this way is clearly capable of indicating this fault mode.
V. CONCLUSION
The present article discusses the development of a smart
actuator with onboard fault diagnostics with an example
application on a small scale Unmanned Aerial Vehicle. The
newly developed servo unit builds heavily on the mechanical
components of a commercial off-the-shelf remote control
servo unit, but its electronics and software are custom
Fig. 9. Operation of the FDF in closed loop with a fault occuring at 11.74 s
designed for the purpose of fault-tolerant safety critical
systems. The reasons behind design decisions are discussed
and the development steps are detailed in the article, followed
by experimental results done on a hardware-in-the-loop test
facility. The future steps should include the characterization
of dominant fault modes of the actuator, along with determin-
ing the reliability figures of the units including mean time
between failures and evaluation of the performance of the
onboard health monitoring unit (true detection rate, missed
detection rate, false alarms).
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